sumptively unreasonable and therefore presumptively unconstitutional. 5 Significant interests are at stake in this debate. On the one hand is the desire to eliminate all chemical weapons, which are particularly frightening because of their use in terrorist attacks and genocide, 7 as well as in conventional warfare. For inspections to be effective,' governments must be prevented from impeding the work of verification inspectors. This is especially true as verification schemes are increasingly being relied upon as the means to enforce international treaties. 9 Furthermore, it is important for the United States to abide by its international commitments; if the United States breaches the CWC, other countries are likely to follow suit. On the other hand, international law, and the American implementation thereof, must respect an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is particularly important in the context of the CWC because of the possibility that members of an inspection teams may disclose or steal confidential business information. 1 0 In light of these constitutional concerns, the Senate imposed a number of conditions when it ratified the CWC; one condition was a requirement that warrants be obtained for all nonconsensual inspections." However, the Senate may not be empowered to condition the treaty responsibilities of the United States in this fashion. Some commentators have suggested that such warrantless inspections are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment exceptions for administrative searches of closely regulated industries" and national security interests." Others have considered whether courts should decline to decide these questions because the issues raised are political questions of foreign relations, expressly delegated to the executive branch.' 4 No solution, however, has yet been proposed that protects both the need to verify compliance with the CWC and the need to ensure civil liberties.
This Comment concludes that an expanded national security exception to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement provides the optimal solution to the constitutional problems inherent in CWC inspections. Part I analyzes the CWC, focusing on the structure of the verification procedures. Part HE considers the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and analyzes the potential effects of the CWC in action. Part I considers four potential solutions to the problem, including expanding the national security exception. Part IV analyzes the potential ramifications of expanding the national security exception to include the verification of disarmament procedures.
I. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The negotiations that produced the Chemical Weapons Convention began in 1970 and were concluded in Paris on January 13, 1993 with the signatures of sixty-five member states. 5 The " See Edward A. Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, 13 Yale J Intl L 21, 41 (1988) (arguing that "a violation of private rights," as distinguished from a "dispute between coequal branches of government," might be justiciable). See also Kevin C. Kennedy, The Constitution and On-Site Inspection, 14 Brooklyn J Intl L 1, 3 (1988) (noting concern that permitting foreign delegations to conduct searches may constitute an unconstitutional delegation of governmental authority). 
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CWC was intended to extend the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 192516 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction. 7 The CWC's express purpose is "to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons"" through the destruction of all stocks of chemical weapons and through the implementation of a verification scheme designed to ensure that new weapons are not produced.
Each State Party, upon ratifying the CWC, assumes five responsibilities. First, the State Party must declare the existence of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities and then destroy them. 9 Second, the State Party must cease future production and stockpiling of chemical weapons." 0 Third, the State Party must provide a general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons, 2 ' declare its annual progress on the implementation of the destruction process, 2 2 and declare and provide information about the facilities that currently produce restricted chemicals for non-prohibited uses. 2 ' Fourth, the State Party must agree to allow its declarations to be verified by inspection.' The verification regime has two main components: regular, on-site inspections of declared facilities, and challenge inspections, which allow a State Party to request the inspection of any facility of another State Party.' Fifth, each State Party must pass domestic legislation implementing the CWC. 26 To implement the CWC, each State Party must create a National Authority to assist in verification measures 27 and must make criminal all activities prohibited by the CWCY 8 In order to ensure compliance with its terms, the CWC authorizes the creation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW). 29 The OPCW is composed of three distinct bodies: the Conference of States Parties (the "Conference"), the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.'°T he Conference, composed of one representative from each State Party, maintains primary authority over the OPCW. 5 ' The Executive Council is a group of forty-one members elected by the Conference for the purpose of facilitating the effective discharge of CWC responsibilities. 32 The Technical Secretariat is the enforcement arm of the OPCW, responsible for managing its day-today operations. I
A. The Verification Process
The CWC verification system has three major elements: mandatory information declarations, periodic on-site inspections of declared facilities, and challenge inspections.' The verification process is designed to control the creation of chemical weapons by limiting the synthesis of toxic chemicals 5 and by regulating the ' The delegates are nominated with emphasis on "the importance of chemical industry," "political and security interests," and "equitable geographic distribution." Id at Art VIII, 23, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 303. The Executive Council is an oversight group that supervises the Technical Secretariat. It has the power to stop frivolous challenge inspections. In addition, it must approve all agreements (including facility agreements) relating to verification of the CWC. Id at Art VIII, It 31, 34, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 304-05; id at Art IX, 17, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 312 (relating to challenge inspections). Facility agreements are general agreements as to the scope and nature of an allowable inspection.
Id at Art VIII, 1 37-38, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 306. It performs verification inspections and data analysis. The Secretariat is composed of as many inspectors and other professionals as are necessary to effectively implement the CWC. Id. The Director General of the Technical Secretariat will hire employees of the Secretariat according to need. Id at Art VIII, 43-44, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 307. Inspectors are chosen from a list submitted by each State Party and tend to be highly skilled professionals. See Moseley, Agency Oversees, Chi Trib at 13 (cited in note 15).
" The verification process is detailed in the Verification Annex of the CWC. The Annexes of the CWC are subject to amendment or to reservations, which adhere to the objects and purposes of the Convention. See CWC, Art XV, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 320-21 (permitting amendments); id at Art XXII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 323 (proscribing reservations to the Annexes that are "incompatible with [the Convention's] object and purpose").
' Toxic chemicals are defined as "[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or production of "precursors," which are the components necessary to synthesize toxic chemicals. 36 Chemicals are classified according to their risk and are divided into four categories: Schedule 1, Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and Other."
The foundation of the verification regime is mandatory information disclosure. Each State Party is required to list all active facilities that produce regulated chemicals, to report the amounts of these chemicals produced, and, in some instances, to allow continuous monitoring of production by on-site data collection instruments." Based on the declared data, the Technical Secretariat performs verification inspections. In addition, data declaration serves as a baseline against which information discovered during a challenge inspection is measured; any unregulated, undeclared production of toxic chemicals discovered by a challenge inspection is evidence of noncompliance with the CWC.
Based on the data declared by State Parties, the Technical Secretariat performs regular on-site inspections to verify that declared facilities are producing declared chemicals at declared levels. Each declared facility is subject to an initial on-site inspection to verify the initial data, 39 as well as subsequent inspections, the style and frequency of which are to be determined by the Schedule and amount of chemicals produced.
Schedule 1 on-site inspections will be conducted at least once a year, 40 subject to the terms of the facility agreement made between the facility owner and the Executive Council. 4 inspection of Schedule I facilities will determine the accuracy of annual data declarations. 4 2 The inspection will be conducted by inspectors of the Technical Secretariat, who must strictly abide by the facility agreement and who must ensure that the inspection imposes the "least possible inconvenience."' Schedule 2 facilities, like Schedule 1 facilities, are subject to yearly on-site inspections; these inspections are also to occur in accordance with facility agreements made between the facility owner and the Executive Council. 44 Again, Schedule 2 inspections must impose no more than minimal intrusion. In actual practice, an inspection of a Schedule 2 facility will be similar to the inspection of a Schedule 1 facility. However, inspection teams must provide forty-eight hours notice before inspections. 45 Inspections of Schedule 3 and Other facilities, which are similar enough in practice to be considered together, will be conducted on a random basis. Due to the large number of these facilities, 6 the CWC limits the number that may be searched. The total number of inspections of Schedule 3 and Other facilities combined may not exceed twenty per year, excluding challenge inspections. 47 There is no CWC requirement that facility agreements be reached for these inspections." The inspection teams, however, are limited by the scope of their inspection mandates and by the general rule that they must minimize interference with operations. The Technical Secretariat must serve notice to the inspected state within 120 hours (or five days) of arrival at the point of entry. 49 The challenge inspection procedure differs substantially from the procedure required for regular inspections. A State Party may be subject to an unlimited number of challenge inspections per year. Both declared and undeclared facilities are subject to chalconclude facility agreements). 
B. Conditions Added at Ratification
Although Article XXII of the CWC prohibits State Parties from adding reservations to its Articles,' 4 the United States Senate ratified the CWC subject to twenty-eight conditions. 5 5 One of these conditions asserted a congressional right to make reservations notwithstanding Article XXII." While it is unclear how the legal conundrum generated by these conditions will be resolved, one particular condition merits immediate discussion.
The Senate's Condition 28 to the CWC requires that the United States National Authority, the executive agency responsible for oversight of CWC activities, seek a warrant for any inspections, routine or challenge, conducted on American territory. 5 7 Technically, challenge inspections are limited because a challenge inspection will not be approved without the presentation of some evidence that tends to demonstrate reasonableness. See id at Art IX, 9, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 311. However, veto of a proposed challenge inspection requires a three-quarters majority vote of the Executive Council, which suggests that authority for challenge inspections will be freely given. The Verification Annex contains detailed instructions regarding the perimeter to be inspected. Unlike regular inspections, where only limited (often prearranged) areas may be inspected, challenge inspections are required to inspect the entire perimeter, subject only to confidentiality concerns. See id at Verification Annex, Part X, 142-52, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 435-37.
Id at Art XXII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 323 ("The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose.').
' Part IIIA discusses whether Congress actually has the power to ratify a treaty conditionally. This condition will likely be buttressed by the legislation to implement the CWC that is currently pending in the Senate. 5 The implementing legislation requires National Authority involvement in every inspection conducted on United States territory." 9 If constitutional, the Senate's conditions will overcome the CWC's Fourth Amendment problems. However, as will be discussed below, there is good reason to think that the Senate may not create these conditions constitutionally.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The effectiveness of the verification regime outlined above will determine the overall success of the CWC. This regime, however, does not require warrants or provide other procedural safeguards that would ensure the reasonableness of an inspection.'o Without some assurance of reasonableness, inspections made pursuant to the CWC may violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects United States residents 6 ' from unreasonable searches and seizures by their government. But constitutional protection exists only to the extent that the United States exercises jurisdiction. Courts have not traditionally afforded Fourth Amendment protection to United States citizens who are searched by agents of foreign governments, unless the United States government has participated in the search in a significant way. 62 This Comment will focus on searches of priAgency affidavit necessary for the issuance of a warrant to inspect).
" As of May 6, 1998, the Implementation Bill was under review in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
" Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997, as amended, ("Revised Implementation Bill") § 303(bX2), S 610, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec S 5070, 5074 (May 23, 1997) (requiring National Authority to coordinate the designation of federal employees to accompany inspectors). Mandatory inclusion of the National Authority will likely also resolve any potential problems involving a violation of Article II, § 2 of the Con-
' The CWC does require that challenge inspections must meet the constitutional standards of the inspected State Party. See note 4. However, because of fears that rogue states will use the U.S.-created loophole to protect their chemical arsenals, the United States should not rest to heavily on this pillar, lest the effectiveness of the entire CWC topple. See Part IV.C.1.
"l Fourth Amendment protection is limited to "the people" of the United States. US Const, Amend IV. Traditionally, this term has been applied to resident aliens as well as citizens. 1NS v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1042 (1984) vately owned facilities on American soil, which is where the Fourth Amendment difficulties will primarily occur.'
A. Fourth Amendment Thresholds
The threshold determination for any Fourth Amendment question is whether there is sufficient governmental action to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. In the context of the CWC, the question is whether a search of a privately owned facility conducted by an OPCW inspection team constitutes sufficient governmental action to be considered a "joint venture.' 4 If the search does not constitute a joint venture, then it will not be considered a governmental search, and the Fourth Amendment will not apply. While the law on joint ventures abroad is well settled,' courts have not yet determined whether a domestic search by an international organization can constitute a joint venture.
Most searches will clearly meet the joint venture standard of "significant participation" when the National Authority accompanies an inspection.' Then the search will be considered a joint tially participated in the raids so as to convert them into joint ventures between the United States and the foreign officials.").
' A related question is whether courts will hold that searches conducted abroad by the OPCW of facilities owned by United States citizens have enough participation by the government to create Fourth Amendment concerns. In these situations, courts must determine whether the United States has contributed enough aid to meet the significant participation standard discussed in Part II-L Any situation where the United States significantly participates-a question of fact that depends on each search's facts and circumstances-raises the same constitutional concerns as domestic searches of private facilities.
" Generally, searches by private citizens that do not involve an agent of the federal government do not violate the Constitution. See Burdeau v McDowell, 256 US 465, 475 (1921) ("It is manifest that there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment... as whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the property of another."). The test for whether a search has sufficient governmental involvement to constitute a joint venture is based upon "participation" and thus is a question of fact. Moody v United States, 163 A2d 337, 340 (DC Mun Ct App 1960), citing Lustig, 338 US at 78 ("[A] search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it.").
' In an international context, the general rule is that searches performed by a sovereign government in its own territory to enforce United States law are not limited by the Fourth Amendment, but searches with United States participation are subject to the same "significant participation" test as a joint venture occurring on United States soil would be. 'This is precisely the solution offered by pending legislation. See Revised Implemen-venture. Significant participation may also include government facilitation of a search, which the United States is obligated to provide under the CWC.' 7 Under the "significant participation" standard for joint ventures," the government need not actually conduct the search itself.
On the other hand, it is not immediately apparent whether inspections that are not supervised by the United States government meet the "significant participation" standard. However, Article 11, Section 3 of the United States Constitution requires that the President "take Care that the Laws [of the United States] be faithfully executed." The OPCW is not a part of the executive branch, 69 but searches carried out by the OPCW will enforce a federal statute. 70 Conferring executive authority will necessarily add some degree of governmental involvement, raising the inspection to a Fourth Amendment-protected joint venture. Therefore, any inspection conducted by an international inspection team, with or without actual United States government involvement in the inspection itself, will likely be a governmental search and therefore will implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Even if a CWC inspection involves governmental action, it does not implicate the Fourth Amendment unless the inspection qualifies as a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment: " [T] here is a twofold requirement, first that a person [searched] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'' Businesses, not just indi- viduals, may possess reasonable expectations of privacy that are protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 A search of a person who meets these criteria will be unconstitutional unless the search was reasonable. A warrant is the principal method of meeting this reasonableness requirement.
B. The Warrant Requirement
The government is presumptively required to obtain a warrant to establish the constitutionality of a search. 7 ' Warrants are required for administrative and criminal searches 74 of both homes and businesses. 7 5 The warrant requirement exists for two reasons. First, the warrant requirement assures "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police. ' Second, the warrant requirement protects citizens from oppressive interference and intrusions from agents of the government. 77 To ensure a reasonable right to privacy, a warrant will be granted only on the basis of probable cause. 7 " To establish probable cause, the government must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the proposed search is reasonable. 7 " The particular contours of probable cause vary by situation. 0 Seattle, 387 US 541, 543 (1967 Generally, the level of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment depends upon the subjective expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 US at 361-62 (Harlan concurring). The warrant requirements for administrative searches are less extensive than for criminal warrants, Camara, 387 US at 534-35 (noting government interest in preventing unintentional code violations), and the amount of evidence necessary to obtain a warrant may be tailored according to the governmental interest involved. See Skinner v Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 US 602, 619 (1989) (balancing "governmental and privacy interests").
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Facilities Inspections
Although warrants are generally required for a search to qualify as reasonable, there are a few exceptions to the warrant requirement. These exceptions apply to situations involving emergency, 8 ' hot pursuit, 82 health risks,s searches of closely regulated industries, and the national security exception.' The two exceptions that pertain directly to the question of warrantless CWC inspections are the closely regulated industries exception and the national security exception.
C. The Closely Regulated Industry Exception
Courts have established a general exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches of industries subject to close regulation." Though the justification for the exception has shifted throughout its history, 87 the exception depends upon implicit acceptance of the test formulated in Katz v United States." In Katz, the Supreme Court limited the applicability of a Fourth Amendment search to those situations in which the individual searched had both a subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 89 Participation in a closely regulated industry subjects an individual to such pervasive and regular scrutiny that one cannot maintain either an objective or a subjective expectation that the regulated premises will be private. Therefore, an inspection of such premises does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because this ex- ' Initially the justification for the exception rested on a theory of 'implied consent." Participation in an industry with a long history of regulation implies that the individual expects regulation as a part of the business. Colonnade Catering Corp v United States, 397 US 72, 75 (1970) (discussing historical basis for inspections in the liquor industry). However, the history of regulation has proven less important than the presence of prevalent regulation in a particular industry as a justification for the exception. See Biswell, 406 US at 316 (Prevalence and regularity of regulation are crucial to determining whether exception should exist.); Donovan, 452 US 594 at 600-05 (Exception recognized in light of extensive regulation and an adequate procedural substitute for a warrant.).
US 347, 360 (1967).
Id.
ception rests on the ground that certain specific industries are so closely regulated that their members lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, however, courts have denied the exception in situations where a statute authorizes warrantless searches that are not tailored to a particular closely regulated industry. 90 In its most recent formulation, New York v Burger, 9 1 the Supreme Court limited the exception to situations where there is no objective expectation of privacy. As a threshold requirement under Burger, the industry upon which a warrantless search regime is imposed must be closely regulated. 2 In addition, for a search to be reasonable, the government request must meet three criteria: the search must further a substantial government interest; the search must be necessary to further this interest; and the regulation scheme must provide "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." 93 Recently, courts have applied the exception to an increasing variety of industries. 4
D. The National Security Exception
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice White raised the possibility that national security may warrant a Fourth Amendment exception. 95 Under the national security exception, courts would presume a search reasonable if the interest in national security is sufficiently strong to justify the intrusiveness of a search. The Supreme Court has never recognized a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment, but lower courts have In Marshall v Barlow's, Inc, 436 US 307, 321 (1978) , the Supreme Court found a portion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA") unconstitutional because it allowed warrantless searches into any workplace. The Court held that statutes not tailored to a particular industry with a history of extensive regulation are unconstitutional to the extent that they allow warrantless searches. Id (holding that reasonableness "will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute").
91 482 US 691, 700 (1987) . Id. Close regulation depends on the "pervasiveness and regularity" of regulationthe test outlined in Donovan, 452 US at 606. See also Burger, 482 US at 701, citingDonovan, 452 US at 600, 606.
" Burger, 482 US at 702. The "constitutionally adequate substitute" test has two requirements that mimic the role of the warrant: that the individual is aware that the search is "made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope," and that the discretion of the officers is limited. Id at 702. occasionally allowed a narrow exception that has generated considerable controversy. 96 Proponents of the national security exception claim that the exception has deep historical roots." Because the Constitution grants national security power exclusively to the executive and legislative branches, courts have held that national security issues are "political questions," which are not justiciable.'e Although the national security exception and the political question doctrine have aspects in common, 99 their underlying principles are not the same. The political question doctrine is fundamentally a doctrine of judicial deference: The judiciary should refuse to decide questions, such as those involving national security, that are fundamentally political in nature."° The national security exception, on the other hand, can be viewed as a reasonableness exception to the warrant requirement, derived from Katz rather than from the political question doctrine.
The national security exception is narrowly tailored. For example, the government has invoked its national security interests as a means to acquire foreign intelligence without a warrant.°' In these situations, courts have permitted warrantless wiretapping because of the need for secrecy and because of an unwillingness to limit executive branch action. However, courts have required a tight nexus between the person wiretapped and a foreign state. One court has upheld the national security exception on the grounds of the political nature of the activity. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F2d at 914-15 (permitting warrantless wiretap due to the compelling needs of the executive branch, noting that the executive is constitutionally designated as the "pre-eminent authority in foreign affars"). See also United States v Erlichman, 546 F2d 910, 928 (DC Cir 1976) (noting that in order to "fix accountability and centralize responsibility," a national security exception to the warrant requirement would mandate personal authorization by the President or the Attorney General).
' 03 the Supreme Court stated that a national security exception was not reasonable without a nexus to a foreign state because "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive branch." 4 The national security exception to the Fourth Amendment has rarely been applied. Moreover, its boundaries are extremely narrow. However, no court has been presented with an opportunity to explore the contours of a national security exception in a non-espionage situation, such as that presented by the CWC.
E. The Validity of CWC Inspections
When the CWC verification procedures are scrutinized under Fourth Amendment standards, problems become apparent immediately. Without an obligation to obtain a warrant, searches conducted in the United States by the OPCW may be constitutionally invalid. In order to analyze potential Fourth Amendment problems, this Part will next look at the two major types of verification procedures-regular on-site inspections and challenge inspections-to determine whether and to what extent the verification regime can avoid Fourth Amendment concerns.
Regular on-site inspections.
On-site inspections should avoid any Fourth Amendment problems. The. National Authority will usually have sufficient time to obtain a warrant after the OPCW provides notification of an inspection. Even if the National Authority cannot (or does not wish to) obtain a warrant in time, many of the inspected facilities are extensively regulated, raising the possibility of a closely regulated industry exception. a) Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities. Facilities that produce Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemicals share four major similarities. First, there are extremely few of them within the United States."°5 Second, these facilities produce relatively small amounts of controlled chemicals."°G Third, the facilities are subject dividual or organization subjected to a wiretap must be a direct agent of a foreign power to trigger the national security exception.). 407 US 297 (1972) . The Keith decision focused solely on the use of the national security exception against domestic problems, where the individuals searched lacked any foreign involvement. Id at 320.
.. Id at 316-17.
[65:943 to tight regulation." 0 7 Fourth, and most importantly, facilities that produce these chemicals are required to reach facility agreements with the OPCW that outline the scope of a potential search.l"a Searches of facilities that produce Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemicals will not raise constitutional problems.' 9 Many facilities will allow warrantless inspections to be conducted pursuant to facility agreements, which are likely to grant consent to any search made of the premises." 0 Even without such an agreement, warrantless searches would fit under the closely regulated industries exception to the Fourth Amendment. The facilities in question form a limited part of a single industry and are subject to comprehensive regulation under the CWC disclosure regime. These elements suggest that Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 producing facilities constitute a closely regulated industry. Moreover, the elements of the Burger test are met:.' the enforcement of the CWC is a significant government interest, inspections are necessary to ensure compliance, and the facility agreements form an "adequate constitutional substitute" for a warrant. . Though the CWC mandates that each facility reach an agreement with the OPCW, the pending United States implementation legislation provides that the agreements cannot require that a person waive her constitutional rights. Revised Implementation Bill § 102, 143 Cong Rec at S 5071 (prohibiting waivers of constitutional rights "as a condition for entering into a contract with the United States or as a condition for receiving any benefit from the United States" for purposes of furthering the CWC).
" While this Part focuses on regular, on-site inspections, challenge inspections are also unlikely to prove constitutionally suspect due to the minimal expectations of privacy at Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities.
" and Schedule 2 facilities." These facilities, however, are not required to sign facility agreements. Furthermore, unlike Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 producing facilities, these facilities are large-scale producers of chemicals; production of Schedule 3 chemicals is not limited."' Because it is estimated that there will be at least one thousand declared Schedule 3 facilities and ten thousand Other facilities within the United States," 4 inspections of these facilities will occur much more randomly and sporadically than at Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 facilities. These differences suggest that the inspections of Schedule 3 and other facilities will not meet the closely regulated industry exception, since the "industry" regulated is tricky to define" 5 and searches will be infrequently performed." 6 Realistically, though, on-site inspections of facilities that produce Schedule 3 and Other chemicals will not raise Fourth Amendment problems. The United States National Authority must be notified at least 120 hours (or five days) before the proposed inspection."' This requirement will provide sufficient time for the National Authority to advise the facility that is to be inspected, to seek its consent, and, if consent is denied, to acquire an administrative search warrant." Challenge inspections raise more serious Fourth Amendment concerns, both theoretically and practically. First, a warrant requirement will be most onerous for challenge inspections because only twelve hours notice is required before an inspection may be- "'To determine whether the inspections of Schedule 3 and Other facilities are searches, courts must apply the Katz reasonableness formulation. It is obviously difficult to determine whether a subjective expectation of privacy will exist in any particular situation, or, if regular inspections of these facilities occur randomly once every twenty years, it would be objectively reasonable to be surprised when searches actually occur. "'Administrative search warrants will not be difficult to obtain. The government will probably only be required to present an affidavit stating that the CWC is in force and that the search is being made pursuant to the Convention. Revised Implementation Bill § 305(b), 143 Cong Rec at S 5075.
960
[65:943 gin and because the inspection process must begin within twelve hours of arrival at the point of entry." 9 On the other hand, a warrant requirement seems particularly justified in this context, given that challenge inspections are the most intrusive inspections authorized by the CWC. These inspections may be performed on any facility without limitation to a particular industry.
The challenge inspection procedure does not guarantee that a warrant will be obtained, so the National Authority usually will have less than twelve hours to persuade a magistrate to issue a search warrant. 2° Unlike regular inspections, the National Authority probably will have to obtain a criminal search warrant 1 rather than an administrative warrant. This raises serious concerns because less evidence will likely be required to receive permission from the Executive Council than would be required to constitute probable cause-a requirement for a criminal search warrant. 1 " In cases where a challenge inspection is not based on sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause, courts will be left in a quandary." "'A loophole does exist that allows inspected states to delay an inspection of the actual facility for up to 108 hours without violating the CWC. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X, 1 39, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 435. However, the facility perimeter must still be secured within twelve hours of arrival, id at Verification Annex, Part X, 1 23, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 432, and, for reciprocity reasons, the United States should not depend upon this loophole.
1 It is true that in many situations warrants can be obtained quite quickly, because the law enforcement official requesting a warrant is likely to know the judge, who will be well-acquainted with the legal requirements of reasonableness and the procedural routine. However, in the case of a CWC warrant request, the National Authority would have only twelve hours to ask the inspected facility for consent, prepare the necessary evidence, travel to the appropriate location, and prepare a brief for a judge who is probably unfamiliar with the challenge inspection process. "'See Ratification Resolution § 2(28)(A)(i), 143 Cong Rec at S 3657. The need for a criminal warrant is based upon the potential criminal liability of the noncomplying State and upon the use of the challenge inspection as a deterrence device.
"=A request for a challenge inspection is denied only if it is proven "frivolous" or in bad faith. CWC, Art IX, 1 17, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 312. Veto of a request for a challenge inspection requires rejection by three-quarters of the executive council. Id. The requirements necessary to prove probable cause are outlined in the implementation legislation. Revised Implementation Bill § 305(bX4), 143 Cong Rec at S 5075. "SUnder the CWC, the constitutionally worst-case scenario is when a State Party requests a challenge inspection but lacks sufficient evidence to justify probable cause. One solution to this problem might be to deny the warrant and inspection, subject to Part X,
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In its effort to verify compliance, the scope of the CWC's challenge inspection procedure strains the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. To avoid Fourth Amendment problems, the search must be reasonable, as determined by the issuance of a warrant or by meeting one of the established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. The challenge inspection, however, does not fit within any previously constructed Fourth Amendment exception, and the CWC's time constraints will cause some challenge inspections to occur without a warrant. Therefore, the procedure must be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment, or else the United States may fall out of compliance with the treaty." 2 A. A Mandatory Warrant Requirement?
Intending to provide to its constituents maximum protection against unreasonable searches or seizures," 2 the Senate required, as a condition to the ratification of the CWC, that the President certify:
that-(i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory of the United States ...
the United States National Authority will first obtain a criminal search warrant... (ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility. .. conducted on the territory of the United States . . . [the] National Authority first will obtain an administrative search warrant.1
26
The enactment of implementation legislation, which, as currently formulated, requires mandatory warrants for nonconsensual searches and gives detailed specifications for probable cause requirements, 2 7 will enforce this solution. If constitutionaljhese provisions may reduce the strain on civil liberties caused by the challenge inspection.
Article XXII of the CWC declares that the Articles of the CWC are not subject to reservation. 28 Yet the Senate conditioned not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purposes."). Condition 28 may be a reservation made to the Annex on Verification rather than a reservation to the Articles themselves. The reservation would conform to the object and purpose of the con-ratification on its express right to make qualifications to the treaty.' 2 9 It based its authority on the Treaty Clause of the Constitution: "[The President] shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." 30 The ability of the Senate to ratify a treaty subject to qualification has never been questioned. 3 ' Traditionally the President has possessed the sole authority to negotiate treaties. 3 2 Here, it might seem that Congress changed the treaty so much as to actually amend the treaty and therefore encroach on executive authority. If the Senate's power to "advise and consent" is construed narrowly, as it traditionally has been," 3 the Senate may not have been empowered to amend the CWC, and, therefore, any reservations placed on the CWC may be void." 3 The Senate did not actually amend the CWC, however. It ratified the CWC subject to twenty-eight "conditions. " "a A "condi- " 4 There is no case law available to determine the proper scope of Congress's authority to place conditions on treaties that are negotiated with no allowance for reservations. The Treaty Clause of the Constitution may alternatively be interpreted in ways that either restrict or empower the Senate. See note 132. While the determination of this issue will affect the interpretation of the CWC, this Comment assumes that warrantless inspections will occur despite their illegality, resulting in the same problem for tribunals. "Congress has used four types of qualifications to alter treaties: reservations, conditions, declarations, and interpretations. Reservations are the only qualification used by Congress that actually "purports to change the legal effect of the treaty upon the United tion" does not change the effect of treaty obligations on the United States." 6 Traditional conditions merely create additional requirements that the United States must meet, some of which may conflict with the CWC. Therefore, to the extent that a conflict exists between the CWC and the Senate's conditions, the law will be unsettled.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution expressly includes treaties as part of "the supreme Law of the Land."' 37 It is unclear whether unnegotiated conditions appended to a treaty should be "the supreme Law." If conditions added by the Senate are not treated as equal to the text of the treaty, the National Authority must concern itself primarily with its CWC obligations, attempting to obtain warrants whenever possible. In this scenario, challenge inspections may occur without a warrant.
If the conditions are treated as a part of the body of the ratified treaty, problems may still occur. The United States National Authority must meet both the requirements of the CWC and of the implementation legislation. The simple solution proposed by Congress actually creates two new constitutional problems.
First, the warrant requirement may prove counterproductive, because the "neutral and detached magistrate" who is to make warrant decisions may not be neutral." In a domestic context, a magistrate may plausibly claim neutrality, because she is uninvolved in the execution of an investigation. Because the CWC is the law, a judge may be unwilling to breach the government's treaty obligations because of constitutional concerns that the judiciary may not be empowered to invalidate a treaty.' 9 It is possible that this magistrate will feel more comfortable granting a warrant lacking sufficient evidence than she would breaching a treaty to which the United States is a party. 40 Thus, the neutral deliberation promised by the warrant requirement appears Mu- (1957) . It is unclear whether the Senate chose to declare its twenty-eight conditions to be "conditions" with full understanding of the interpretive meaning of this phrase.
'"US Const, Art VI, c 2. States, 333 US 10, 14 (1948) . See Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 996 (1979) . "This circumstance offers the most plausible explanation for the inclusion of the constitutionality exception to the challenge inspection procedure, suggesting that judges will, in fact, have the power to deny warrants. See CWC, Verification Annex, Part X, 41, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 435. However, the crucial factor here is not whether a judge has the ability to issue a warrant, but whether her neutrality may be plausibly be questioned.
[65:943 sory; the warrant issued might not meet Fourth Amendment standards, requiring alternative proof of reasonableness.
Second, parts of the implementation legislation designed to facilitate the warrant process may be unconstitutional."' The proposed legislation sets out the requirements necessary to prove probable cause. This legislation may require courts to adhere to a congressional interpretation of the Constitution, which is problematic because such interpretational power rests primarily with the courts. 42 Both of these constitutional difficulties compromise the congressional solution to the challenge inspection problem. The Senate conditions are unlikely to assuage the Fourth Amendment concerns under any scenario, which prompts the question of whether there is an alternative solution to the Fourth Amendment problems created by the CWC. Three potential solutions will be considered below.
B. Extending the Closely Regulated Industry Exception
One possible alternative that may alleviate the Fourth Amendment concerns would be to extend the closely regulated industry exception.' 43 This alternative seems plausible because the majority of challenge inspections will occur in facilities that already produce restricted chemicals, thus possessing diminished privacy expectations. However, this solution is unacceptable for two reasons.
First, the challenge inspection procedure has been interpreted by the Senate in its Implementation Bill as a criminal search, while courts only have applied the closely regulated industry exception to administrative searches. The doctrine was designed to accommodate the diminished privacy needs of an administrative search; to expand the doctrine to a context where 141 Because the Revised Implementation Bill has not been enacted, any discussion of its constitutionality is necessarily speculative. See note 58. 'See Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 638 (cited in note 12) (arguing that such an expansion of the exception will provide an optimal solution to the problem of routine inspections). The author admits that challenge inspections of undeclared facilities would require a warrant, id at 632-33, which runs counter to many of the statements that the note makes regarding the importance of reciprocity to an adequately functioning CWC. Id at 628.
searches are designed to uncover criminal activity destroys the intent of the exception because criminal searches warrant higher protection.
Second, the exception has only been allowed when the authorizing statute has been tailored to a particular, wellregulatgd industry. By contrast, challenge inspections may be performed in any workplace or, conceivably, in a private residence.' The closely regulated industry exception exists because certain industries that are pervasively regulated cannot maintain an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. By expanding the exception to cover challenge inspections, the implication is that participation in any industry in which chemicals are used or manufactured puts an individual on notice for potential criminal searches for CWC violations. This implication treads perilously close to retracting Fourth Amendment protection from businesses.
C. Judicial Deference: The Political Question Doctrine
The Constitution delegates broad powers concerning foreign relations to the executive.' Some commentators have suggested that, in light of the need for uniformity in foreign policy, the judiciary should refrain from analyzing the constitutionality of procedures required by a treaty negotiated by the executive. 46 While the judiciary generally grants great deference to executive actions in foreign policy matters, 4 7 this solution will prove unacceptable for the present circumstances.
Executive authority over foreign relations is limited by the requirements of the Constitution.' 4 The executive has no authority to negotiate a treaty that infringes upon rights protected by the Constitution. Under Reid v Covert,' where the Supreme '"The latter possibility is slight given the definition of a chemical weapons-producing facility, which sets the production level that proves noncompliance with the CWC at one tonne. CWC, Art II, 1 8, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 283-84.
'"See note 132.
'"Under such a system, the judiciary would decline on jurisdictional grounds to hear all suits brought by victims of warrantless searches. A hypothetical situation of this type is presented in Tanzman, 13 Yale J Intl L at 38-41 (cited in note 14).
... Consider the deference given to the executive decision to wiretap for foreign intelligence purposes, discussed in Part II.D.
'"The position that a treaty can never authorize something forbidden by the Constitu- Court invalidated an executive agreement on the grounds that the executive could not use the treaty power to supersede his constitutional authority, courts scrutinize the actions of the executive branch to determine that it has not exceeded its constitutional limitations. To the extent that the challenge inspection violates Fourth Amendment rights, judicial deference becomes an abdication of a constitutionally mandated responsibility. Because it fails to question whether executive power has outstripped its mandate, judicial deference is too blunt a tool to use in the delicate process of treaty compliance.
D. A National Security Exception
In order to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizenry while adhering to treaty obligations, the judiciary must review executive actions. In particular, courts must determine whether an inspection conducted without a warrant is independently reasonable. The interests of national security provide a basis on which to make this determination. One commentator has recently suggested that the unmodified national security reasonableness test may save the constitutionality of the challenge inspection." 5° She contends that the interests of national security, as defined by the executive, "would be sufficient to support a finding that the government's interest outweighs the individual's privacy interests." 5 ' Thus, in her opinion, the national security exception, as currently constructed, would grant challenge inspections per se reasonableness.' 52 Two problems, however, limit the usefulness of the national security exception as it is currently formulated. First, existing case law demonstrates an absolute unwillingness to apply a national security exception domestically.' If applied domestically, the executive could invoke the national security exception in any situation where the government feared that the activities of its citizens posed a direct threat to the government. Oregon, 366 US 187, 194 (1961) Second, "national security" is generally viewed as the Pandora's box of totalitarianism. Once courts develop a national security exception for the Fourth Amendment, critics fear that courts will find the exception increasingly difficult to limit, given the large number of activities that the government may characterize as involving national security." 5 Unlike the other reasonableness exceptions, which have been developed with particularity by courts, the executive has traditionally maintained the power to determine whether something is a matter of national security. An unmodified national security exception would fail to protect constitutional civil liberties sufficiently.
However, modifying the national security exception by including a requirement that the national security search be reasonable can produce major benefits. Developing such an exception will create a rational justification for judicial oversight of the treatymaking power of other branches. Previously, courts have allowed the President to invoke national security by relying on the political question doctrine, which, in this context, begs the question of whether the executive decision legally can be made. The proposed exception would allow some judicial deference while sustaining the judiciary's ultimate power of oversight and would give judges a way to defer temporarily to the United States's treaty obligations while allowing the judiciary to retain the ability to make a reasonableness determination.
IV. EXPLORING THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
The United States has bound itself both to the CWC and to Congress's own supplementary conditions. Though the National Authority will obtain warrants whenever possible, circumstances will arise when it will not be able to do so. Of the aforementioned solutions, modifying the national security exception provides the only alternative that can protect both the constitutional rights of parties inspected and the governmental obligation to uphold the treaty. A. Should a National Security Exception Exist?
Critics base their attacks on the national security exception on two arguments, one ideological and one pragmatic." Some critics are fearful of the national security exception because they fear the destruction of rights; any exception to the warrant requirement, which may label an entire class of inspections reasonable, threatens Fourth Amendment rights. In this context, no national security interest is strong enough to overcome the constitutional protection of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.' 56 One critic finds the national security exception particularly disturbing because the exception is extremely hard to limit.' Because the executive can determine what constitutes national security, critics believe that the judiciary will never be able to control the exception, inevitably leading to the destruction of Fourth Amendment protection.
Loss of rights.
The use of a national security exception must ultimately be justified as a balancing test."s The recent history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports the claim that civil rights may be limited in the face of an overarching policy concern.' 5 9 The interests involved in national security clearly demand a similar balancing test, under which the legitimate preservation of sovereignty must be weighed against the importance of individual rights. The legislature has recently decided that civil rights are outweighed by national security concerns in the context of alien deportation: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 allows the United States government to deport aliens when a suspicion of terrorist activity poses a threat to national '"See, for example, Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 640-41 (cited in note 12) (noting that inquiry into reduced privacy expectations necessarily involves case-by-case analysis and is thus "no more than a rule of thumb'); Kopel and Olson, 21 Okla City U L Rev at 329-35 (cited in note 154).
. security." 6 In addition, the Supreme Court found a similar balance in United 6 ' holding that extradition of an alien to the United States does not provide that alien with Fourth Amendment rights. These instances illustrate that the civil rights of individuals can be limited in the face of overarching policy concerns.
Loss of judicial control.
The argument that the executive will determine what constitutes national security demonstrates the same conflation of the political question doctrine and Fourth Amendment reasonableness that has plagued judicial consideration of the national security exception. The executive clearly has the authority to label certain issues as involving national security. When it is constitutional to do so, courts should adhere to this opinion and should decline to rule on subsequent claims.
The judiciary must remain vigilant in limiting the executive's power to use national security in an unconstitutional manner. The Supreme Court did just that in Keith.' 62 Second, when determining whether a search is reasonable, courts should use their own interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to determine what level of national security interest reasonably merits an exception from the warrant requirement.
Ultimately, the determination of whether to allow a national security exception depends on a measurement of the interests at stake. An interest of national security should make a search objectively reasonable if the interest is sufficiently grave and if the magnitude and probability of injury to the individual is slight. In the context of the CWC, this balance will often weigh in favor of national security for two reasons. First, the destruction of chemical weapons is a true interest of national security; few would argue that the nation's interests are not best served by the universal elimination of these devices. Second, adherence to ratified treaty obligations are a central concern to the nation. If the United States cannot be trusted to adhere to its responsibilities, it will lose international credibility. Thus, if a national security exception can be developed that will minimize the risk of injury to civil liberties, then the exception should be used. 6 494 US 259, 266 (1990) .
1407 US at 320 (disallowing national security exception for purely domestic concerns). In foreign intelligence cases, the nexus between foreign relations and national security is a tight one; in the CWC context, the nexus is slightly more attenuated. tion, and the interest must be to protect the nation rather than to suppress a dissident group. If this threshold is met, the security interest must meet two additional requirements, based on the Burger test for the closely regulated industry exception: (a) the solution must be necessary for the interest to function properly, and (b) the solution must provide an adequate constitutional substitute for a warrant." The purpose of these additional requirements is to limit any desire the judiciary might have to defer to national security, broadly.
However, the next Part will analyze the challenge inspection scenario in particular, to determine whether the procedural and substantive limitations fulfill their duty.
C. Implementing a National Security Exception
For the national security exception to solve the constitutional problems raised by the CWC challenge inspection, courts must determine that, because of the objective reasonableness of the national security interests involved, a challenge inspection meets the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment even without a warrant. In order to meet these requirements, the CWC must meet two criteria: it must be a true national security interest; and its challenge inspection process must be objectively reasonable under the modified Burger test.
True national security.
To prove that it raises concerns of true national interest, courts must determine that noncompliance with the CWC will result in a threat to the integrity of the nation and that the search serves national security, not domestic control. Because the actual search will be conducted by foreign officials who work for an international organization, the CWC clearly meets the second criterion. Two factors weigh in favor of considering compliance with the CWC to be in the interest of national integrity. First, the integrity of the nation depends on its ability to protect its citizens from attack. Chemical weapons pose a true risk to national security because of their use in terrorist acts, as well as in conventional warfare. Noncompliance, or even delayed compliance, would allow "cheating" states the opportunity to restrict United States inspection teams from conducting inspections. Second, noncompliance will hurt the integrity of the nation because it will 1 "While the use of the Burger test is obviously only an example of a possible procedural constraint that may be applied, for simplicity's sake the test will be used as an example in Part IV.C as well.
weaken the bargaining position of the United States in the international community.
2. Objective reasonableness.
The challenge inspection process must also meet the procedural safeguards of a national security exception, as expressed in the modified Burger test. The inspection procedure has already passed the first hurdle, which requires that the searches must further a national security interest. Courts may disagree on the second hurdle, which is whether the inspections are necessary. Some courts may determine that warrantless challenge inspections are not necessary for compliance with the CWC, because the warrant inspections will suffice to catch violators. However, a more pragmatic judge would understand that the purposes of the CWC, and of national security, cannot adequately be met by a warrant requirement. 67 The third criterion, whether the CWC's challenge inspection procedure provides an adequate substitute for a warrant, should pose no problem." All challenge inspections are limited by the CWC to mTinimize intrusiveness." 9 In addition, participation by the National Authority should ensure that individuals realize that an inspection has been conducted pursuant to federal law.
Ultimately, unless courts determine that it is never necessary for challenge inspections to proceed without a warrant, a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment should allow warrantless challenge inspections to occur, while retaining judicial protection of Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
In order to eliminate chemical weapons, the CWC requires a verification method, the challenge inspection, which may violate the Fourth Amendment. If the United States proves unable to combat the Fourth Amendment problems through conditions added by the Senate to the CWC at the time of ratification, courts must develop an alternative that maintains the effectiveness of the CWC, while retaining judicial oversight of constitutional "'This judge would also realize that a warrant is not mandatory for a search to be constitutional, eliminating the usefulness of the CWC constitutionality clause in this situation.
'"For the requirements of the actual Burger test, see notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
'"See CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 40, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 115 ("[Tlhe inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid affecting its safety ... .").
rights. The exigencies of the situation provide an opportunity to modify the national security exception to the Fourth Amendment, unshackling the exception from its historic ties to the political question doctrine, and systematizing it, so that national security may be used to measure the reasonableness of the CWC and future treaty verification procedures.
